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Abstract
In security protocols,message exchange between the intruder and honest participants induces a form
of state explosion which makes protocol models inﬁnite. We propose a general method for automatic
analysis of security protocols based on the notion of frame, essentially a rewrite system plus a set of
distinguished terms calledmessages. Frames are intended to model generic crypto-systems. Based on
frames, we introduce a process language akin to Abadi and Fournet’s applied pi. For this language,
we deﬁne a symbolic operational semantics that relies on uniﬁcation and provides ﬁnite and effective
protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model.
We spell out a regularity condition on the underlying frame, which guarantees completeness of our
method for the considered class of properties, including secrecy and various forms of authentication.
We show how to instantiate our method to some of the most common crypto-systems, including
shared- and public-key encryption, hashing and Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange.
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1. Introduction
Many of the methods employed in security protocol analysis are based conceptually on
a model dating back to Dolev and Yao [18], where a (hostile) intruder has total control
over the communication network. In particular, it is assumed that the intruder can learn,
hide or replace any message in transit on the network. It can also synthesize new messages
starting from learned messages and using arbitrary combinations of operations like nonce
creation, pairing, encryption and decryption. The intruder cannot guess secret keys or forge
messages it cannot synthesize. Thus, sending a message on the network means handing it to
the intruder, while receiving a message from the network means accepting any message the
intruder can synthesize at a given moment. Due to the latter point, any Dolev–Yao model
is in principle inﬁnite.
Traditional ﬁnite-state model checking has been employed in security protocol analysis
(e.g., [26,32,36,39]), under two simplifying assumptions: (a) there is a bound on the number
of protocol runs, and (b) at anymoment, there is a bound on the number of possiblemessages
the intruder can synthesize and send to honest participants. Discarding either of these two
assumptions leads to inﬁnite models. Also, these bounds have to be chosen carefully: due
to the combinatorics of message generation, the size of the model tends to explode as the
number of principals and data values increases.
In general, it is known that discarding assumption (a) leads to undecidability of protocol
analysis, unless severe syntactic restrictions are imposed on the analysed protocols (see
e.g. [4,15,19,20,23,34]). In particular, in the presence of pairing and encryption, an even
weak form of iteration (the ability to create arbitrarily many protocol instances) allows for
encoding of 2-counter machines, which in turn implies undecidability of e.g. secrecy, based
on information transfer from one protocol instance to another (blind copying) [35].Wanting
to preserve decidability and an expressive term language, one is left with little choice but
keeping assumption (a), hence ruling iteration out.
In the last few years, symbolic approaches have been proposed that make inﬁnite-state
analysis possible and lead to discard assumption (b) [4,8,15,30]. These approaches focus on
speciﬁc crypto-systems (typically, shared- or public-key encryption), and the corresponding
completeness proofs are rather ad hoc. The present paper introduces a general framework
for symbolic protocol analysis. It can be viewed as an attempt at presenting in a uniform
manner methods based on uniﬁcation (e.g. [8,4]), while extracting a common factor out
of the related proof techniques. When instantiated to speciﬁc crypto-primitives, under a
condition of regularity that we illustrate below, the framework yields complete veriﬁcation
methods. In those case studies that we have actually experimented [9], the method is also
quite effective in practice.
More in detail, we start by introducing a notion of frame, essentially a term rewriting
system plus a set of distinguished terms called messages. We consider a generic signature
 that may include constructors and destructors for various cryptographic operations. The
meaning of -terms is provided by an evaluation relation ↓ that maps terms to messages.
On top of the evaluation relation, we introduce a deduction relation  that describes how
the environment can synthesize newmessages from known ones. On top of a generic frame,
we introduce a process language akin to Abadi and Fournet’s applied pi [1], that can be
used to describe protocols. Protocol properties are formalised as correspondence assertions
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between I/O events, or actions, of the form “every execution of action  must be preceded
by some execution of action ”.
In agreement with the Dolev–Yao approach, the “concrete” operational semantics of
the process calculus is inﬁnitary, because each input action gives rise to inﬁnitely many
transitions. This problem is overcome by introducing a symbolic operational semantics. In
the latter, as a result of a receive operation, input variables are not instantiated, rather they are
constrained as the computation proceeds. Constraints are generated by symbolic evaluation
of terms representing crypto-operations, and take the form of most general uniﬁers (mgu’s)
between terms of the signature. As an example, evaluation of shared-key decryption of 
using key , written dec(), generates a mgu  for the equation  = {x}, for a fresh x.
The result of the decryption is therefore represented as (x). Mgu’s are propagated through
whole process terms as soon as they are generated. The resulting transition system is ﬁnitely
branching, hence it yields ﬁnite models when protocols with a ﬁnite number of participants
are considered.
Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model,
and provide a regularity condition on the given frame, under which the method is proven
sound and complete with respect to the concrete semantics. In other words, for regular
frames every attack detected in the symbolic model corresponds to some attack in the
concrete one, and vice-versa. Thus, our method makes no approximation with respect to
the inﬁnitary, concrete model. For instance, type-dependent ﬂaws (see e.g. [22]), which
usually escape ﬁnite-state analysis, with our approach naturally emerge when present. The
regularity condition roughly amounts to requiring that the set of messages deducible from
any trace of the protocol can be syntactically built out of a ﬁnite basis of messages, and that
the induced ﬁnite-basis operation commutes with substitution.
We show how to instantiate the general framework to some of the most common crypto-
systems, providing frames for shared- and public-key encryption, digital signature, hashing
and Difﬁe–Hellman exponentiation. The proof of regularity is covered in detail for the
public-key frame only. We also highlight the relevance of the regularity condition by pro-
viding an example of a meaningful non-regular frame. This also illustrates the limits of our
approach.
Our method is quite efﬁcient in practice, because in the symbolic model there is no state-
explosion induced by message exchange: every input action gives rise exactly to one sym-
bolic transition. We have developed a prototype tool, STA (Symbolic Trace
Analyzer), based on this method [41]. Experimentation with STA has given very encour-
aging results [9].
Related work: Early work on symbolic analysis is due to Huima. In [24], the execution of
a protocol generates a set of equational constraints. Only an informal description is provided
of the kind of equational rewriting needed to solve these constraints. Approaches based on
symbolic analysis were also exploited in [8,3,21], all of which focus on shared-key encryp-
tion. The work [8] introduces a shared-key only version of our symbolic method. In [3],
unlike our approach, symbolic execution and consistency check are not kept separate, and
this may have a relevant impact on the size of the computed symbolic model. Another point
worth noting is that, in [3], a brute-force method is needed to resolve variables in key posi-
tion: such variables have to be instantiated to every possible name used by the participants;
this fact may lead to state explosion, too. In [21], a procedure is provided to analyse the
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knowledge of the environment, based on a symbolic semantics akin to [8]. The approach
applies to protocols with arbitrary messages as keys, but, like ours, it is proven complete
only for atomic keys. Also, the method suffers from the same problem as [3] concerning
brute-force instantiation. The paper [4] extends the symbolic reachability analysis of [3] to
hash functions and public key cryptography and establishes some complexity results.
Developments of the symbolic approach not speciﬁcally relying on uniﬁcation are pre-
sented in [15,30]. The decision technique in [15] is based on a reduction to a set constraint
problemwhich is in turn reduced to an automata-theoretic problem. Completeness is proven
by assuming rather severe restrictions on protocol syntax. The technique in [30] focuses on
reachability properties and is based on constraint solving; the approach makes use of the
strand space formalism [42] to specify protocol processes. The symbolic reduction and the
knowledge analysis are separated and the latter is performed by a procedure for constraint
solving procedure.
Some recent papers [7,16,33,34] focus on protocols with unbounded instances and un-
bounded message size, and give veriﬁcation algorithms that terminate under certain as-
sumptions, like tagging. Other recent work addresses the symbolic analysis problem in the
presence of low-level cryptographic operations and, in particular, modular exponentiation
[31,13,40]. Blanchet’s model [6] abstracts away from operations like inverse, root extrac-
tion and random number generation. The resulting method may give rise to false attacks
and may not terminate. Pereira and Quisquater ﬁrst [31] proposed a technique for analysing
group Difﬁe–Hellman protocols in the presence of an attacker with restricted capabilities
(e.g. no symmetric encryption), though not facing the issue of decidability. Chevalier et al.
[13] demonstrated that the protocol analysis problem is decidable and NP-complete in the
presence of modular exponentiation. Shmatikov [40] proved that the above problem in the
presence of Abelian group operator and exponentiation is decidable for a ﬁnite number of
protocol sessions. Also related to these approaches is protocol analysis in the presence of
the xor operation, which has been recently proven to be decidable by Chevalier et al. [12]
and, independently, by Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [17].
Summary: In Section 2 we introduce the notion of frame at the basis of our method. In
Section 3 we present the process language, its concrete and symbolic semantics, and we
study the relationship between the two semantics. In Section 4 we describe the veriﬁca-
tion method based on the symbolic semantics. Throughout Sections 2–4 we use public-key
cryptography as a running example. An extended system featuring shared-key, public-
key, digital signature and hashing is considered in Section 5; this section also contains
an example of non-regular frame. In Section 6 we illustrate an application to a low-
level primitive, modular exponentiation, hence, the Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange. Sec-
tion 7 illustrates STA on the classic Needham–Schroeder protocol. In Section 8 we draw
some conclusions. Detailed proofs of a few technical results are conﬁned to Appendices
A, B and C.
2. A general framework
In this section, we present the main ingredients of our framework. We introduce the
concept of frame, that is, a structure consisting of a signature, a set of (legal) messages
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and an evaluation relation. Then, we deﬁne the notions of process, trace, conﬁguration and
security property.
2.1. Frames
We consider two countable disjoint sets of namesm, n, . . . ∈ N and variables x, y, . . . ∈
V . The set N is in turn partitioned into a countable set of local names a, b, . . . ∈ LN
and a countable set of environmental names a, b, . . . ∈ EN : these two sets represent
inﬁnite supplies of fresh quantities (keys, nonces, …), that can be used by processes and
environment, respectively. The set N ∪ V is ranged over by letters u, v, . . . . The fact that
LN and EN are disjoint guarantees that nonces and keys generated by honest participants
cannot be guessed in advance by the environment (of course, local names might be learned
and then used by the environment), and vice-versa.
Given a ﬁnite signature  of function symbols f, g, . . ., each coming with its arity
(constants have arity 0), we denote by E the algebra of terms (or expressions) onN ∪V∪,
given by the grammar:
,  ::= u | f (˜),
where ˜ is a tuple of terms of the expected length. A term context C[·] is a term with a hole
that can be ﬁlled with any term , thus yielding a term C[].
Deﬁnition 1 (Frame). A frame F is a triple (,M,↓), where:
•  is a signature;
• M ⊆ E is a set of messagesM,N, . . .;
• ↓⊆ E × E is an evaluation relation.
In the sequel, we write  ↓  for (, ) ∈ ↓ and say that  evaluates to . In typical
frame instances the relation ↓ will be both a function and a congruence with respect to the
operations in , but we need not to assume these facts in the general framework. In fact,
as we shall see in Section 6, a non-deterministic evaluation relation can be used to model a
commutative operation.
Next, we deﬁne a deduction relation (  ), which speciﬁes how the environment can
generate newmessages starting from an initial set ofmessagesS. Our deﬁnition of deduction
relation is not given by a set of deductive rules. Rather, we make use of the setH(S), which
consists of all the expressions inductively built by applying functions of  to elements of S
and of EN . We denote by Pf (X) the set of ﬁnite subsets of X.
Deﬁnition 2 (Deduction relation). For F = (,M,↓) a frame and S ⊆ M, the set
HF (S) is inductively deﬁned by the following clauses:
H0F (S) = S ∪ EN
Hi+1F (S) = HiF (S) ∪ {f (˜) : f ∈ , ˜ ⊆ HiF (S) }
HF (S) =
⋃
i≥0
HiF (S).
398 M. Boreale, M.G. Buscemi / Theoretical Computer Science 338 (2005) 393–425
Table 1
Fpk , a frame for public key encryption
SIGNATURE  = {(·)+, (·)−, {[·]}(·), 〈·, ·〉, i (·) (i = 1, 2), decpk(·)(·)}
MESSAGES M,N ::= u | u+ | u− | {[M]}u+ | 〈M,N〉
(PRJ) i (〈1, 2〉)  i (i = 1, 2)
(DEC) decpk
− ({[]}+ )  
(CTX)
′
C[]C[′]
EVALUATION  ↓  $⇔ ∗
The deduction relation F ⊆ Pf (M)×M is deﬁned by
S F M
$⇔ ∃  ∈ HF (S) :  ↓ M.
A messageM is deducible from S if S F M .
When no confusion arises, we simply writeH(S) forHF (S) and  for F .
Example 1 (Public-key encryption). A frame Fpk = (,M,↓) for public-key cryptog-
raphy is deﬁned in Table 1. The functions of  are: generation of public ((·)+) and pri-
vate ((·)−) keys, encryption with a public key ({[·]}(·)), decryption using a private key
(decpk(·)(·)), pairing (〈·, ·〉) and selection (i (·)). Public and private keys are represented
by u+ and u−, respectively. Names and variables can be used to build compound
messages via public-key encryption and pairing. In particular, {[M]}m+ represents
the message obtained by encrypting M under m+. Primitives for pairing and public key
encryption of messages can be arbitrarily nested. Non-atomic keys are forbidden in mes-
sages: this restriction is crucial in our method, as we will show in Example 7.
The deﬁnition of evaluation relation makes use of an auxiliary relation , that mod-
els the mechanisms of public key encryption under the perfect cryptography assumption
(see e.g. [18]).
As an example of deduction, if S = { {[〈a, b〉]}k+ , k− } then S  a, since  = 1(decpkk −
({[〈a, b〉]}k+)) ∈ H(S) and  ↓ a. Note that, whatever S, the set of messages deducible from
S is inﬁnite.
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Table 2
Syntax for agents
AGENTSA A,B ::= 0 (null)
| a(x). A (input)
| a〈〉. A (output)
| let y=inA (evaluation)
| [ = ]A (matching)
| A || B (parallel composition)
The occurrences of variables x and y are bound.
2.2. Processes
2.2.1. Syntax
As a base language, we consider a variant of the applied pi-calculus [1], parametrised
by an arbitrary frame F (for readability, we omit explicit reference to F in the notation).
The syntax of agent expressions, whose set we name A, is reported in Table 2. A single
construct (let) for expression evaluation replaces the ad hoc constructs found in the spi-
calculus for encryption, decryption and other cryptographic operations. Themain difference
from applied pi is that, here, we consider a set L of input and output labels, ranged over
by a, b, . . ., which must not be regarded as channels—according to the Dolev–Yao model,
we assume just one public network—but, rather, as ‘tags’ attached to process actions for
ease of reference. We do not consider the pi-calculus restriction operator: it could be easily
accommodated, but it has no semantic relevance, in the absence of iteration.
Given the presence of binders for variables, notions of free variables, v(A) ⊆ V , and
alpha-equivalence arise as expected. We shall identify alpha-equivalent agent expressions.
For any  and x, [/x] denotes the operation of substituting the free occurrences of x by .
An agent expression A is said to be closed or a process if v(A) = ∅ ; the set of processes
P is ranged over by P,Q, . . .. Local names and environmental names occurring in A are
denoted by ln(A) and en(A), respectively. A process P is initial if en(P ) = ∅ .
Example 2 (The Needham–Schroeder protocol). We consider the classical Needham–
Schroeder protocol as described, e.g. in [26]. The protocol involves two honest partici-
pants, A and B, which want to authenticate with one another. A is the initiator, B the
responder:
(1) A−→B : {[nA, idA]}kB+ (nA fresh nonce),
(2) B −→A : {[nA, nB]}kA+ (nB fresh nonce),
(3) A−→B : {[nB]}kB+ .
We formalise below a ‘one-shot’ conﬁguration of this protocol, NS, where two distinct
instances of A are willing to talk to B and to a malicious insider I, a participant whose role
is played by the attacker. An instance of B is willing to respond to A (this example will be
analysed in Section 7). A disclose action is supposed to have provided the environment with
its initial knowledge (identities and public keys of participants, plus the insider’s private key
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information). To simplify the notation, we use a few self-explaining notational shorthands,
like c({[y, n]}k+). P for
c(x). let x′=decpk
k−(x)in let y=1(x
′)in let y′=2(x′)in [y′ = n]P,
for fresh x, x′, y′.
A
$= a1〈{[nA, idA]}kB+〉. a2({[nA, xnB]}kA+). a3〈{[xnB]}kB+〉. 0
|| a’1〈{[n′A, idA]}kI+〉. a’2({[n′A, xnI ]}kA+). a’3〈{[xnI ]}kI+〉. 0
B
$= b1({[ynA, idA]}kB+). b2〈{[ynA, nB]}kA+〉. b3({[nB]}kB+). 0
NS $= 〈disclose〈kI, kA+, kB+, idA, idB, idI〉, (A || B)〉 .
2.2.2. Operational semantics
The semantics of the calculus is given in terms of a transition relation −→ , which we
will sometimes refer to as ‘concrete’ (as opposed to the ‘symbolic’ one we shall introduce
later on). We model the state of the system as a pair 〈s, P 〉, where s records the current
environment’s knowledge (i.e., the sequence of messages the environment has “seen” on
the network up to a given moment) and P is a process term. An action is a term of the form
a〈M〉 (input action) or a〈M〉 (output action), for a a label and M a message. The set of
actions Act is ranged over by ,, . . ., while the set Act∗ of strings of actions is ranged
over by s, s′, . . . . String concatenation is written ‘·’ . We denote by act(s) and msg(s) the
set of actions and messages, respectively, appearing in s. A string s is closed if v(s) = ∅
and initial if en(s) = ∅ . In what follows, we shall often write ‘s M’ for msg(s) M and
‘M ∈ s’ forM ∈ msg(s).
Below we deﬁne traces, i.e. sequences of actions that may result from the interaction
between a process and its environment. In traces, each message received by a process
(input message) must be synthesizable from the knowledge the environment has previously
acquired. In conﬁgurations, the environment’s knowledge is explicitly recorded as a trace.
Deﬁnition 3 (Traces and conﬁgurations). A trace is a closed string s ∈ Act∗ such that for
each s1, s2 and a〈M〉, if s = s1·a〈M〉·s2 then s1 M .
A conﬁguration, written as 〈s, P 〉, is a pair consisting of a trace s and a process P .
A conﬁguration is initial if en(s, P ) = ∅ . Conﬁgurations are ranged over by C, C′, . . . .
The concrete transition relation on conﬁgurations is deﬁned by the rules in Table 3.
Each action taken by a process is recorded in the conﬁguration’s ﬁrst component. Rule
(INP) makes the transition relation inﬁnitely-branching, as M ranges over the inﬁnite set
{M : s M,M closed}. In rule (OUT),  is evaluated before the action takes place. By rule
(LET), the evaluation of  replaces any occurrence of y in P . Note that, while we require
that evaluation of terms sent on the network yields closed messages, for the purpose of
internal computation (rules (LET) and (MATCH)) we do allow evaluation to arbitrary terms.
No handshake communication is provided: all messages go through the environment (rule
(PAR)). By C−→nC′ we mean that C reduces to C′ in n execution steps.
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Table 3
Rules for the transition relation (−→ )
(INP) 〈s, a(x). P 〉 −→ 〈s·a〈M〉, P [M/x]〉 s M, M closed
(OUT) 〈s, a〈〉. P 〉 −→ 〈s·a〈M〉, P 〉  ↓ M ,M closed
(LET) 〈s, let y=inP 〉 −→ 〈s, P [/y]〉  ↓ ,  closed
(MATCH) 〈s, [ = ]P 〉 −→ 〈s, P 〉  ↓ ,  ↓ 
(PAR)
〈s, P 〉−→〈s′, P ′〉
〈s, P ||Q〉−→〈s′, P ′ ||Q〉
plus symmetric version of (PAR).
2.3. Properties
We express security properties of a protocol in terms of the traces generated by the pro-
tocol. In particular, we focus on correspondence assertions of the kind ‘for every generated
trace, whenever action  occurs in the trace, then action  must have occurred at some
previous point in the trace’. Given a conﬁguration 〈s, P 〉 and a trace s′, we say that 〈s, P 〉
generates s′, written 〈s, P 〉 ↘ s′, if 〈s, P 〉 −→∗ 〈s′, P ′〉 for some P ′.
We let 	 range over ground substitutions, i.e. substitutions that map variables to closed
messages, and denote by t	 the result of applying 	 to an arbitrary term t .
Deﬁnition 4 (Satisfaction relation). Let  and  be actions and s be a trace. We say that
 occurs prior to  in s if whenever s = s′··s′′ then  ∈ act(s′). For v() ⊆ v(), we
write s←↩ , and say s satisﬁes ←↩ , if for each ground substitution 	 it holds that 	
occurs prior to 	 in s. We say that a conﬁguration C satisﬁes ←↩ , and write C←↩ ,
if all traces generated by C satisfy ←↩ .
Assertions  ←↩  can express interesting secrecy and authentication properties. As an
example, in the ﬁnal step of many protocols, a principalA sends a message of the form {N}k
to a responderB, where {N}k is obtained by encrypting some authentication informationN
under a newly established shared-key k. Our scheme permits expressing that everymessage
encrypted with k that is accepted byB during the execution of the protocol indeed originates
from A, i.e. that B is really talking to A, and that k is authentic. If we denote by ﬁnalA and
ﬁnalB the labels attached to A’s and B’s ﬁnal action, respectively, then the above property
might be formalised as an assertion ﬁnalA〈{x}k〉 ←↩ ﬁnalB〈{x}k〉, for x a variable.
Example 3 (Needham–Schroeder Protocol—Cont.). Consider the protocol conﬁguration
NS deﬁned in Example 2.The property that, at step 3, B should only accept authentic
messages, i.e. messages truly originating from A, is expressed by the following assertion:
AuthAtoB $= a3〈{[z]}kB+〉 ←↩ b3〈{[z]}kB+〉,
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with z fresh in NS. This means that any message received by B at step 3 and having the
form {[N ]}kB+ , for some N , must have been previously sent by A at step 3. As we shall see
in Section 7, property AuthAtoB is not satisﬁed by NS.
In practice, all forms of authentication in Lowe’s hierarchy [27] are captured by this
scheme, except for the most demanding one requiring a one-to-one bijection between ’s
and ’s. However, our scheme can be easily adjusted to include this stronger form, by
requiring that each  is preceded by exactly one occurrence of .
Another property that can be set within our framework is secrecy in the style of [5]. In this
case, it is convenient to ﬁx a conventional ‘absurd’ action ⊥ that is nowhere used in agent
expressions. Thus, the formula ⊥ ←↩  means that action  should never take place. Now,
the fact that a protocol, say P , does not leak a sensible datum, say d, can be expressed also
by saying that the adversary will never be capable of synthesizing d. This can be formalised
by extending the protocol to include a ‘guardian’ that at any time picks up one message
from the network, P || g(x). 0, and then requiring that this guardian will never receive d,
that is, 〈
, P || g(x). 0〉⊥←↩ g〈d〉. Note that in our framework it is also possible to verify
a more general form of secrecy, in which a datum d cannot be leaked until a certain event,
represented by a certain action event, occurs. This property can be speciﬁed by replacing
the absurd action above with the event action: event ←↩ g〈d〉.
3. Symbolic semantics
The symbolic semantics we present in this section is based on the notion of symbolic
frame. The latter is essentially a frame equipped with an additional symbolic evaluation
relation, which is in agreement with its concrete counterpart.
A substitution  in a frame F is a ﬁnite partial map from V to the set of messagesM
of frame F such that (x) = x, for each variable x. Let us denote by Subst the set of all
substitutions in a given frame. For any object t (i.e. variable, message, process, trace,. . .),
we denote by t the result of simultaneously replacing each x ∈ v(t)∩dom() by (x). For
 a substitution, we denote by dom() and cod(), the domain and the co-domain of . By
|V , we denote  restricted to V , i.e. {(x, (x)) | x ∈ V }. A substitution  is a uniﬁer of t1
and t2 if t1 = t2. We denote by mgu(t1, t2) a chosen most general uniﬁer (mgu) of t1 and
t2, that is, a uniﬁer  of t1 and t2 such that any other uniﬁer is a composition of substitution
 with some ′, written ′. 1 Also, for t1, t ′1, t2, t ′2 terms, mgu(t1 = t ′1, t2 = t ′2) stands for
(mgu(t2, t ′2)), where  = mgu(t1, t ′1), if such mgu’s exist.
We introduce below the symbolic evaluation relation ↓s , which extends the evaluation
relation to open terms. Intuitively,  ↓  means that  evaluates to  under any possible
instance of . We require that  ↓  be image-ﬁnite, i.e., for each , the set {(, )|  ↓ }
is ﬁnite up to renaming of variables. The main advantage of the symbolic relation over the
1 We assume the standard notion of composition of substitutions (cf. [25]): for 1 = [t1/y1, . . . , tk/yk] and
2 = [t ′1/x1, . . . , t ′n/yn], 12 = [t12/y1, . . . , tk2/yk] ∪ {[t ′i/xi ] ∈ 2 | xi /∈ dom(1)} \ Id, where IdV is the
identity relation on variables.
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Table 4
Symbolic Evaluation Relation (↓s ) for F spk
(DECS ) dec
pk
 ()
S x1   = mgu( = {[x1]}x+2 ,  = x
−
2 )
(PRJS ) i ()
S xi  (i = 1, 2)  = mgu(, 〈x1, x2〉)
(ENCS ) {[]}x
S {[]}x+  = [x+/x]
(CTXS )

S ′
C[] S C[′]
SYMBOLIC EVALUATION  ↓  iff  1S · · · nS  and  = 1 · · · n
Variables x1 and x2 are fresh.
concrete one (↓) is that inﬁnitely many pairs (, ) such that  ↓  can be represented by
means of a single judgement 0 ↓ 0, for some 0, , 0.
Deﬁnition 5 (Symbolic frame). A symbolic frame is a pair F s = (F,↓s), where F =
(,M,↓) is a frame, and ↓s ⊆ E × Subst × E is an image-ﬁnite symbolic evaluation
relation (we write  ↓  for (, , ) ∈↓s) such that, for any expression  and ground
substitution 	 with v() ⊆ dom(	), the following hold:
(a) If 	 ↓ , then there exist , ,	0 such that  ↓ , 	 = (	0)|dom(	) and  = 	0.
Furthermore,  ∈M implies  ∈M.
(b) If  ↓  and 	 = 	0, for some 	0, then 	 ↓ 	0.
Note that in the above deﬁnition,may in general both contain variables of  and introduce
fresh variables.
Example 4 (Public-Key Encryption—Cont.). F spk is deﬁned as (Fpk,↓s), where ↓s is the
reﬂexive and transitive closure of the relation (S), as given in Table 4.
Proposition 1. F spk is a symbolic frame.
Proof. See Appendix C.1. 
We now come to symbolic counterparts of traces and conﬁgurations. Condition (b) in
the deﬁnition below states that only the environment can introduce variables into symbolic
traces.
Deﬁnition 6 (Symbolic traces and conﬁgurations). A symbolic trace is a string s ∈ Act∗
such that: (a) en(s) = ∅ , and (b) for each s1, s2,  and x, if s = s1 ·  · s2 and
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x ∈ v()− v(s1) then  is an input action. Symbolic traces are ranged over by ,′, . . . .
A symbolic conﬁguration, written 〈, A〉S , is a pair composed by a symbolic trace  and
an agent A, such that en(A) = ∅ and v(A) ⊆ v().
Note that, due to Condition (b) in the Deﬁnition 6, for instance, a〈x+〉 · a〈{[h]}x+〉 is not
a symbolic trace, while a〈{[h]}x+〉 · a〈x+〉 is.
Once a symbolic frame F s is ﬁxed, conﬁgurations can be equipped with a symbolic
transition relation, −→S , as deﬁned by the rules in Table 5 (for the sake of readability
we omit any explicit reference to F s). There, a function new(·) is assumed such that, for
any given V ⊆ﬁn V , new(V ) is a variable not in V . We also make use of the following
notation: for Y = {y1, . . . , yn}, by Y = new(V ) we mean that y1 = new(V ), y2 =
new(V ∪{y1}), . . . , yn = new(V ∪{y1, . . . , yn−1}). Moreover, C −→S C′ stands for C −→S
C′, where  is the substitution applied toC′ in the reduction step, i.e., 〈, A〉S −→S 〈′, A′〉S
means 〈, A〉S −→S 〈′, A′〉S and ′ =  ·  or ′ = , for some action .
Note that, differently from the concrete semantics, input variables are not instantiated
immediately (rule (INPS ). Rather, constraints on these variables are computed and prop-
agated as soon as needed. This may occur due to rules (OUTS ), (LETS ) and (MATCHS ).
In the following example, after the ﬁrst step, variable x gets instantiated to name b by a
(MATCH
S
)-reduction:
〈
, a(x). [x = b]P 〉S −→S 〈a〈x〉, [x = b]P 〉S −→S 〈a〈b〉, P [b/x]〉S .
Whenever 〈, A〉S −→∗S 〈′, A′〉S for some A′, we say that 〈, A〉S symbolically gener-
ates ′, and write 〈, A〉S ↘S ′. Due to the image-ﬁniteness of ↓, the relation −→S is
ﬁnitely branching, hence each conﬁguration generates a ﬁnite number of symbolic traces.
For example, consider the process P = a(y). let x=decpk
k−(y)in a〈x〉. 0. By the rules in
Table 4, the initial conﬁguration 〈
, P 〉S generates the following symbolic traces:

, a〈y〉, a〈{[z]}k+〉 (for some fresh z), a〈{[z]}k+〉 · a〈z〉.
It is important to stress thatmany symbolic traces are in fact ‘inconsistent’, that is, sequences
of actions that cannot be instantiated to any concrete trace. For instance, the symbolic trace
a〈{[z]}k+〉 · a〈z〉 above is not relevant for the analysis, because the environment cannot
generate the value k+ in {[z]}k+ (i.e. 
k+, hence 
{[z]}k+ ). The problem of detecting
these inconsistent traces, that might give rise to ‘false positives’ when checking protocol
properties, will be faced in the next section. The notion of consistency is formally deﬁned
below.
Deﬁnition 7. Given a symbolic trace  and a ground substitution 	, we say that 	 satisﬁes
 if 	 is a trace. If it is the case, we also say that 	 is a solution of . A symbolic trace 
is consistent if there exist solutions of .
The task of checking consistency of symbolic traces is a crucial point of the veriﬁca-
tion method presented in the next section. Theorem 1 below establishes a correspondence
between the concrete and the symbolic transition relations.
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Table 5
Rules for symbolic transition relation (−→S )
(INPS ) 〈, a(x). A〉S −→S 〈·a〈x〉, A〉S
(OUTS ) 〈, a〈〉. A〉S −→S 〈·a〈M〉, A〉S  ↓ M
(LETS ) 〈, let x=inA〉S −→S 〈, A[/x]〉S  ↓ 
(MATCHS ) 〈, [ = ]A〉S −→S 〈, A〉S  ↓1 1,  1 ↓2 2,
3 = mgu(12, 2),
 = 123
(PARS )
〈, A〉S −→S 〈′, A′〉S
〈, A || B〉S −→S 〈′, A′ || B ′〉S
plus symmetric version of (PARS ). In the above rules it is assumed that, for V
the set of free variables in the source conﬁguration:
(i) x = new(V );
(ii) v() \ V = new(V );
(iii) in rule (PARS ), B ′ = B where 〈, A〉S
−→S 〈′, A′〉S ;
(iv) msg() ⊆M.
Theorem 1 (Concrete vs. symbolic semantics). LetF s be a symbolic frame, C be an initial
conﬁguration and s be a trace of F . Then C ↘ s if and only if there exists  such that
C ↘S  and s is a solution of .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
4. A veriﬁcation method
We ﬁrst deﬁne regular frames, i.e., frames for which it is possible to determine a ﬁnite
basis function for the synthesis of messages. Then we introduce a reﬁnement procedure
that can be used to check consistency of symbolic traces. Finally, we present a veriﬁcation
method based on reﬁnement that applies to regular frames.
4.1. Regular frames
It is convenient to extend the syntax ofmessages with a new class of variables. Informally,
these variables will be used as place-holders for generic messages known to the environ-
ment. Formally, we consider a new set V̂ ofmarked variables, in bijection with V via a map-
ping ·ˆ; thus, variables x, y, z, . . . have marked counterparts xˆ, yˆ, zˆ, . . . .Marked messages
(resp., traces) are messages (resp., traces) that may also contain marked variables. Also, for
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S ⊆ M, the set H(S) in Deﬁnition 2 is extended to include marked variables, that is, we
re-deﬁneH0F (S) as follows:
H0F (S)
$= S ∪ EN ∪ V̂.
The deduction relation (S M) remains formally unchanged. Note that in case S andM do
not contain marked variables, the new deﬁnition coincides with Deﬁnition 2. Since marked
variables are intended to carry messages known to the environment, the satisfaction relation
is extended below to marked symbolic trace according to this intuition. For any xˆ and any
trace , we denote by \xˆ the longest preﬁx of  not containing xˆ.
Deﬁnition 8 (Consistency). Let  be a marked symbolic trace and 	 be a ground substi-
tution. We say that 	 satisﬁes  if 	 is a trace and, for each xˆ ∈ v(), it holds that
(\xˆ)	 	(xˆ). In this case, we say that 	 is a solution of , and that  is consistent.
The terminology introduced above agrees with Deﬁnition 7 when  does not contain
marked variables. We give now the deﬁnition of solved form, that lifts the concept of trace
to the non-ground case (note that this deﬁnition is formally the same as the deﬁnition of
trace, Deﬁnition 3).
Deﬁnition 9 (Solved forms). Let  be a marked symbolic trace. We say  is in solved form
(sf) if for every 1, a〈M〉 and 2 s.t.  = 1·a〈M〉·2 it holds that 1 M .
Next, we deﬁne regular frames, which enjoy a ‘ﬁnite-basis’ property. Basically, this
property states the existence, for any  in solved form, of a ﬁnite set of ‘building blocks’,
out of which all messages deducible from  can be syntactically built: this requirement is
stated by Condition 1, below. Condition 2 requires that basis functions and substitutions
commute with each other. In fact, this would be the exact meaning of b(	) = b()	,
but for our purposes inclusion ⊆ sufﬁces. Deﬁne the set of messages deducible from 
as D() $= {M | M}. The additional ‘sanity’ conditions v(b()) ⊆ v() and b() ⊆
D() \ (EN ∪ V̂) are also desirable to rule out weird or redundant bases (in fact, they are
sufﬁcient to guarantee correctness of our method, as we shall see in Section 4).
Deﬁnition 10 (Regular frames). A symbolic frame F s is regular if there exists a basis
function b : Act∗ −→ Pf (M) such that for each solved form  of F s , v(b()) ⊆ v()
and b() ⊆ D() \ (EN ∪ V̂) and for all 	 satisfying :
(1) 	 M if and only ifM ∈ H(b(	));
(2) b(	) ⊆ b()	.
For each , b() is said a basis of .
Example 5 (Public-key encryption—Cont.). Let us consider the frame for public key en-
cryption introduced in Example 1. A basis function for F spk selects, for a given  in sf, a
set consisting of plain variables, local names, keys, and encrypted messages that cannot
decomposed out of smaller messages deducible from . In the following, byM = (u)± we
meanM = u orM = u+ orM = u−.
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Deﬁnition 11 (Function bpk).
bpk()
$= {M | ( M) and (M = (u)±, for some u ∈ LN ∪ V, or ∃N, u :
M = {[N ]}u+ and 〈N, u+〉 ) }.
Note that bpk() may in general contain encrypted open terms, e.g. for  = c〈xˆ〉 ·
c〈{[xˆ]}k+〉,bpk() = {{[xˆ]}k+}. In practice, for a given in sf, the setbpk() can be effectively
computed by an iterative procedure, which repeatedly applies destructors (decpk(·)(·) and
i (·)) to messages in , until some ﬁxed point is reached. This procedure always terminates.
The frameF spk deﬁned in the above example is regular, as stated by the following theorem,
whose proof is reported in Appendix C.2.
Theorem 2. F spk is a regular frame with basis function bpk .
We shall exhibit an example of symbolic but non-regular frame in Section 5.
4.2. Reﬁnement
In the reﬁnement procedure, each input message in a symbolic trace is tentatively uniﬁed
to some message that can be synthesized from a basis for past messages. By iterating this
step, one can check whether a given symbolic trace can eventually be instantiated to a trace
in the concrete model. In particular, given any symbolic trace  we can compute the set of
the ‘most general instances’ of  satisfying the solved form property, denoted by SF().
Deﬁnition 12 (Reﬁnement and SF()). We let reﬁnement, written " , be the least binary
relation over marked symbolic traces of a regular frame given by the two rules below. In
(REF1), ′ is the longest preﬁx of  that is in solved form and  = ′·a〈M〉·′′, for some
′′. Assume N,N ′ /∈ V ∪ V̂ .
(REF1)
M = C[N ] N ′ ∈ b(′)  = mgu(N,N ′)
 " 0
,
(REF2)
x ∈ v(M)
 " [xˆ/x]
,
where  = 
, 0 $= { x/xˆ | xˆ ∈ v() and |()\xˆ| < |\xˆ| }.
For any symbolic trace , we let SF() $= { ′ | "∗ ′ and ′ is in sf }.
Rule (REF1) implements the basic step of reﬁnement: a subtermN ofM gets uniﬁed, via
, to an element of b(′). By rule (REF2) a variable can get marked: it will be treated as
a known constant in subsequent steps of reﬁnement. Note that in a (REF1)-step a marked
variable xˆ may possibly be‘unmarked’ back to the plain variable x. This is achieved via the
renaming 0, and happens precisely when application of  causes the ﬁrst occurrence of xˆ
to move backward in the trace.
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Example 6. Consider =c〈{[a]}k+ , d〉 ·c〈{[b]}k+ , e〉 ·c〈{[x]}k+ , d〉, and let ′=c〈{[a]}k+ , d〉 ·
c〈{[b]}k+ , e〉. It holds that
bpk(′) = {{[a]}k+ , d, {[b]}k+ , e}.
Two possible reﬁnements of , via the ﬁrst rule, are  " [a/x] and  " [b/x]; the reﬁned
traces are in sf. The remaining reﬁnement of  is  " [xˆ/x]. Note that [xˆ/x] is not in sf,
since ′ 〈{[xˆ]}k+ , d〉 (in particular, ′{[xˆ]}k+ ). Hence SF() = {[a/x], [b/x]}.
Proposition 2. Let  be a symbolic trace. Then SF() is ﬁnite.
Proof. The thesis follows from two facts: (a) " is a ﬁnitely branching relation, and (b)
inﬁnite sequences of reﬁnement steps cannot arise. As to the latter point, ﬁrst note that each
(REF1)-step eliminates at least one variable: this stems from the deﬁnition of mgu, and from
the fact that v(N,N ′) ⊆ v(). Hence any sequence of reﬁnement steps can contain only
ﬁnitely many (REF1)-steps and, after the last of them, rule (REF2) can only be applied a
ﬁnite number of times. 
We now prove that the solutions of a symbolic trace  can be completely characterised
in terms of the solutions of the symbolic traces in SF(). The proof of this fact is based
on Lemma 1 below, which basically states that any consistent symbolic trace that is not in
solved form can be further reﬁned.
Lemma 1 (Progression lemma). Let F s be a regular frame and  be a marked symbolic
trace. Suppose that there exists some 	 which satisﬁes . Then either  is in sf, or there are
′ and 	′ such that  " ′, 	 = ′	′, and 	′ satisﬁes ′.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Theorem 3. LetF s be a regular frame,  be a symbolic trace, and s be a trace inF s . Then
s is a solution of  if and only if s is a solution of some ′ ∈ SF().
Proof. Suppose s = ′	 is a solution of ′. Then, obviously s is a solution of , as ′ = ,
for some  (note that by deﬁnition  does not contain marked variables). On the converse,
suppose s = 	 is a solution of . By repeated application of the previous lemma, we ﬁnd
that there is ′ in solved form and 	′ s.t. that  "∗ ′, s = 	 = ′	′ and 	′ satisﬁes ′.
Hence, by deﬁnition, s is a solution of ′. 
Note that each solved form has a non-empty set of solutions: a trivial solution is obtained
by mapping each variable of  to any name in EN . This fact and the above theorem imply
that a symbolic trace  is consistent if and only if SF() = ∅ . It follows that computing
SF() gives an effective method to decide consistency of .
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Table 6
The veriﬁcation method
M(C, ←↩ )
1. computeModC = { | C ↘S };
2. foreach  ∈ModC do
3. foreach action  in  do
4. if ∃  = mgu(, ) and
5. ∃ ′ ∈ SF() where ′ = ′ and
6. ′ does not occur prior to ′ in ′
7. then return(No, ′);
8. return(Yes);
4.3. The veriﬁcation method
The method M(C, ←↩ ) described in Table 6 can be used to verify if C ←↩  or
not. If the property is not satisﬁed, the method computes a trace violating the property,
that is, an attack on C. The method always terminates, because the symbolic transition
relation −→S is ﬁnitely branching, hence the setModC of symbolic traces generated by C is
ﬁnite.
The functioning of the method is best explained by considering the speciﬁc case  = ⊥,
i.e. veriﬁcation of C⊥ ←↩ . This means verifying that in the concrete semantics, no
instance of action  is ever executed starting from C. By the correspondence between
symbolic and concrete semantics (Theorem 1), this amounts to checking that for each
 symbolically generated by C, no solution of  contains an instance of . The method
proceeds as follows. First, it checks whether there is a mgu  of  and , for every action 
of  ∈ModC . If, for every , such a  does not exist, or it exists but  is not consistent (this
means that the check ∃′ ∈ SF() at step 5 fails), then the property holds true, otherwise
it does not, and the trace ′ violating the property is reported.
We shall see a step-by-step illustration of our method at work on a speciﬁc example in
Section 6.
Remark 1. In practice, rather than generating the whole set of symbolic traces at once
(step 1) and then checking the property, it is convenient to work ‘on-the-ﬂy’ and comparing
every last symbolic action  taken by the conﬁguration against action  of the property
←↩ ; the reﬁnement procedure SF(·) is invoked only when  and  are uniﬁable. This is,
in fact, the way our symbolic trace analyser STA works. The complexity of the method in
the worst case is expected to be exponential, since the analysis problem is easily seen to be
NP-hard (see e.g. [38]).
The correctness and completeness of themethod in the general case is stated byTheorem4
below.
Theorem 4 (Correctness and completeness). Let F s be a regular frame, C be an initial
conﬁguration of F s and  and  be actions of F s such that v() ⊆ v().
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(1) If M(C, ←↩ ) returns (No, ′) then C /  ←↩ . In particular, for any injective
ground substitution 	 : v(′)→ EN , it holds that C ↘ (′	) and (′	) / ←↩ .
(2) If C /  ←↩  then M(C, ←↩ ) returns (No, ′) and for any injective ground
substitution 	 : v(′)→ EN , C ↘ (′	) and (′	) / ←↩ .
Proof. (1) According to the method, there exist a trace , an action  ∈ , a uniﬁer  =
mgu(,), and ′ such that: ′ = ′ ∈ SF(), C ↘S , and
′ occurs in ′ but ′ does not occur prior to ′ in ′. (1)
Given 	 as in the hypotheses, s $= ′	 is a solution of  and, by applying Corollary 1, it
follows that C ↘ s. Also, by (1) and by the injectivity of 	 on v(′), ′	 may not occur
prior to ′	 in s, otherwise ′		−1 = ′ would occur prior to ′		−1 = ′ in
′, contrary to (1). Hence s / ←↩ .
(2) Suppose C ↘ s and s /  ←↩ . By deﬁnition, there exists 	1 such that 	1 does
not occur prior to 	1 in s. Let i be the position of the leftmost occurrence of 	1 in s.
By C ↘ s and by Corollary 1, it follows that there exists  such that C ↘S  and s is a
solution of , i.e. s = 	2, for some 	2. Since v() and v() are universally quantiﬁed, we
can assume v(,)∩v() = ∅ and so dom(	1)∩dom(	2) = ∅. Let 	0 $= 	1∪	2 and  be
the ith element of . It follows that 	0 = 	0. Thus, we can consider  = mgu(, ). By
deﬁnition, 	0 is an instance of , i.e. 	0 = 	′0, for some 	′0. Hence, s = 	′0 is a solution
of . By Theorem 3, there exists a sf ′ = ′ ∈ SF() such that s is a solution of ′,
i.e. s = ′	′′0, for some 	′′0. Necessarily
′ does not occur prior to ′ in ′, (2)
because otherwise ′	′′0 = 	1 would occur prior to ′	′′0 = 	1 in s, contradicting
the hypotheses. Therefore, we have found , , , and ′ such that M(C, ←↩ ) returns
(No, ′). Finally, given 	 as in the hypotheses, ′	 is a solution of . Thus, C ↘ (′	) by
the fact that C ↘S  and by Corollary 1. Also, (′	) / ←↩  as ′	 (= ′	) occurs
in ′	 at position i, but ′	 does not occur in ′	 prior to position i, by (2) and by the
injectivity of 	. 
Note that assertion (1) (correctness) of the above theorem only depends on the properties
of the set SF() of (a) being ﬁnite, and (b) containing only instances of . These two
properties depends entirely on the sanity conditions of the deﬁnition of basis function.
Thus, it makes sense to weaken Deﬁnition 10 as follows:
Deﬁnition 13. A symbolic frame is weakly regular if for each solved form  it holds that
v(b()) ⊆ v() and b() ⊆ D() \ (EN ∪ V̂).
This allows us to state a useful and more general form of correctness:
Theorem 5. Let F s be a weakly regular frame, C be an initial conﬁguration of F s and
 and  be actions of F s such that v() ⊆ v(). Then assertion (1) stated in Theorem 4
holds true.
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5. ‘Black-box’ cryptographic primitives
We consider extending the symbolic frame for public key cryptography F spk to deal with
some of the most common cryptographic operations.
The set  is enriched by means of appropriate operators for shared-key encryption {·}(·)
and decryption decsk(·)(·), digital signing [{·}](·) and verifying decds(·)(·) and hashingH(·). The
syntax of messages is extended via the following additional clauses:
M,N ::= ... as in Table 1
| {M}u | [{M}]u− | H(M) .
The symbolic and concrete evaluations are given in terms of an auxiliary relation ,
deﬁned as expected. In particular, hashing has no rules, digital signature rules are just the
same as for public key, but the roles of u+ and u− are swapped. For shared key, the concrete
and symbolic rules are as follows:
decsk ({})  decsk () S x where  = mgu( = {x}).
Pursuing the idea of selecting ‘building blocks’ out of deducible messages, a basis func-
tion for this frame can be deﬁned by extending the basis function of the public key frame
with all messages of the form {M}u (resp. [{M}]u− ,H(M)) such that u (resp. 〈M,u−〉,
M).
The example below shows that the restriction to atomic keys is crucial to ensure the
regularity condition.
Example 7 (A non-regular frame). Consider the frame deﬁned above, but modiﬁed so as
to allow messages with non-atomic keys in shared-key encryption, thus:
M,N ::= · · · | {M}N.
This frame is symbolic, but not regular. To see the latter, assume by contradiction there is
a basis function b(·) for this frame and consider the symbolic trace
 = a〈b〉 · a〈xˆ〉 · a〈{b}k〉 · a〈{c}{xˆ}k 〉
which is in solved form. Take 	 = [b/xˆ]. Clearly 	 satisﬁes , and 	  c. However, c /∈
H(b(	)), which violates Condition 1 in the deﬁnition of basis function. To see this, note
that by deﬁnition xˆ, c /∈ b(), hence c /∈ b()	, hence, by Condition 2, c /∈ b(	). From
this it easily follows by induction that c /∈ H(b(	)).
6. Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange
In this section we instantiate our framework to the analysis of protocols based on a
‘low-level’ operation, modular exponentiation. First, we brieﬂy recall one such protocol,
the Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange, then we introduce a frame for shared-key and modular
exponentiation, within which this protocol can be analysed.
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The Difﬁe–Hellman protocol is intended for exchange of a secret key over an insecure
medium,without prior sharing of any secret. The protocol has two public parameters: a large
prime p and a generator  for the multiplicative group Z∗p = {1, . . . , p − 1}. Assuming A
and B want to establish a shared secret key, they proceed as follows. First, A generates a
random private value nA ∈ Z∗p and B generates a random private value nB ∈ Z∗p. Next, A
and B exchange their public values (exp (x, y) denotes xy mod p):
1. A−→B : exp (, nA),
2. B −→A : exp (, nB).
Finally, A computes the key as K = exp (exp (, nB), nA) = exp (, nA × nB), and B
computes the key as K = exp (exp (, nA), nB) = exp (, nA × nB). Now A and B share
the value K , and A can use it to, say, encrypt a secret datum d and send it to B:
3. A−→B : {d}K .
The protocol’s security depends on the difﬁculty of the discrete logarithm problem: it is
computationally unfeasible to compute y if only x and exp (x, y) are known. The protocol
is believed to be secure in the absence of ‘active’ attackers, but a well-known attack exists
in the presence of active intruders.
Deﬁnition 14 (Frame FDH). A frame for exponentiation and shared-key cryptography
FDH = (,M,↓) is deﬁned in Table 7.
Besides shared-key encryption {} and decryption decsk () (with  used as a key), the
other symbols of represent arithmetic operationsmodulo a ﬁxed and public prime number,
which is kept implicit. In particular, we have exponentiation exp (, ), root extraction
root (, ), a constant  that represents a public generator, two symbols for multiplicative
unit (unit, 1), two symbols for product mult(, ) and its result  × , three symbols,
inv(), inv′() and −1, for the multiplicative inverse operation. The aim of using multiple
symbols for each of the above operations is to ensure termination of the symbolic relation, as
explained later on. All the underlying operations are computationally feasible. 2 Amessage
is either a product of up to l values, for a ﬁxed constant l, or a key or a message encrypted
under a key. A key can be either an atomic object, or an exponential with base  and a
product exponent (exp (, F )).
Evaluation (↓) is the reﬂexive and transitive closure of an auxiliary relation. There,
we use 1 × 2 × · · · × n as a shorthand for 1 × (2 × · · · × n), while (i1, . . . , in) is
any permutation of (1, . . . , n). The relation  is terminating, but not conﬂuent. In fact,
the non-determinism of is intended to model the commutativity and the associativity of
the product operation, as reﬂected in the rule (MULT). Also, note rule (ROOT): in modular
arithmetic, taking the kth root amounts to raising to k−1 mod p − 1.
The choice of the abovemessage formats and rules corresponds to imposing the following
restrictions on the attacker and on the honest participants:
(1) there is a ﬁxed upper bound (l) on the number of factors;
2 An abstraction we make is that a unique operation is used to model both inverse mod p and inverse mod p−1
(the latter operation arises only inside exponents). Also, we are ignoring that, in modular arithmetic mod n, the
inverse of k modulo n is deﬁned only if gcd(k, n) = 1 (see e.g. [29]).
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Table 7
FDH, a frame for modular exponentiation
SIGNATURE  = {  , unit , 1 , {·}(·) , decsk(·)(·) , exp (·, ·) , root (·, ·) ,
· × · , mult(·, ·) , inv(·) , inv′(·) , (·)−1 }
FACTORS f ::= u | u−1
PRODUCTS F ::= 1 | f1 × · · · × fk
KEYS K,H ::= f | exp (, F )
MESSAGES M,N ::= F | K | {M}K
(DEC) decsk ({})
(MULT) mult(1 × · · · × k, k+1 × · · · × n)i1 × · · · × in 1 ≤ k < n ≤ l
(INV1) inv(1 × · · · × n)inv′(1)× · · · × inv′(n) n ≤ l
(INV2) inv′(−1) (INV3) inv′()−1 (INV4) inv′()× unit
(UNIT1) unit×  (UNIT2) unit1
(EXP) exp (exp (, ), )exp (,mult(, ))
(ROOT) root (exp (, ), )exp (,mult(, inv()))
(CTX)
′
C[]C[′]
EVALUATION  ↓  iff ∗
(2) product and inverse operations cannot be applied to exponentials and to encrypted
terms;
(3) exponentiation starts from the base , and exponents can only be product terms.
More accurately, starting from a term obeying the above conditions, an attacker is capable of
‘deducing’ all—thoughnot necessarily only—ACvariants of themessage represented by the
term. Thus, if one such variant, in a computation, leads to an attack, it will be considered
by the operational model. Restriction (1) might be relaxed at the cost of introducing a
set of multl operations, one for each l0, but for simplicity here we stick to the above
model.
The example below illustrates typical usage of the evaluation and of the deduction
relations.
Example 8. Consider a set S = { nA,exp (, nB) }. Then, S exp (, nA × nB) and
S exp (, nB × nA). A further example involves root extraction. Consider a set
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S = { {m}exp (,k×l), exp (, k × h), h, l }. Then, S m since there exists  ∈ H(S),
 = decsk ({m}exp (,k×l)), with  = exp (root (exp (, k × h), h), l), s.t.  ↓ m.
The symbolic evaluation relation ↓s of FDH is presented in Table 8: it is deﬁned as the
reﬂexive and transitive closure of the relation S. We can now explain the adoption of
multiple symbols in the case of product (mult and ×), inverse (inv, inv′ and ()−1), and
unit (unit and 1). If we used just one symbol for, say, product, the rewrite rule (MULT
S
) in
Table 8 would be non-terminating, e.g.:
x × y S (xi1 × · · · × xin) 
′
S ((yj1 × · · · × yjm)× · · · × xin) 
′′
S · · · ;
similarly, for inverse and unit operations. On the contrary, the use of multiple symbols and
the form of the rules ensure termination of the evaluation relation.
Example 9. Consider P = a〈k〉. a(x). let z=root (x, k)inP ′. After an output action and
an input action, the symbolic evaluation of root (x, k) produces a global substitution  =
[exp (, x1)/x] (x1 fresh), to be applied to the whole conﬁguration, and a local substitution
′ = [exp (, x1 × k−1)/z], to be applied to P ′. I.e.
〈
, P 〉S −→∗S 〈, P ′′〉S with  = a〈k〉 · a〈x〉.
In analogy to the public- and shared-key cases, we can deﬁne a basis function for
FDH by considering all ‘non-decomposable’ messages deducible from a given : we have
two more cases to consider here, non-decomposable products (i.e., products with no de-
ducible sub-products), and exponentials with non-decomposable exponent. Let us write
G ⊂ F if G and F are products, and the set of factors of G is strictly included
in F ’s.
Deﬁnition 15 (A basis function for FDH). For each symbolic trace :
bDH()= {M | ( M) and
(
M ∈ LN ∪ {,1} ∪ V
or (M = F and G, ∀G ⊂ F)
or (M = exp (, F ) and G, ∀G ⊂ F))
or (M = {M}K and K)
) }.
We strongly conjecture that FDH equipped with the above basis function is a regular
frame, but the details remain to be worked out. On the other hand, it is easy to check that
this basis function turns FDH into a weakly regular frame (Deﬁnition 13). Thus we can
appeal to Theorem 5 to make attacks found with the symbolic method correspond to attacks
on the concrete model.
We now analyse the Difﬁe–Hellman Protocol. The process P deﬁned below is a de-
scription of the Difﬁe–Hellman protocol presented in the introduction. For simplicity,
we just describe a one-session version of the protocol, using again a few obvious
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Table 8
Symbolic evaluation relation (↓s ) for FDH
(DECS ) dec
sk
 ()
S x1   = mgu( = {x1}x2 ,  = x2)
(MULTS ) mult(1, 2)
S (xi1 × · · · × xin ) 


1 ≤ k < n ≤ l,
 = mgu(1 = x1 × · · · × xk,
2 = xk+1 × · · · × xn)
(INV1S ) inv()
S (inv′(xi1 )× · · · × inv′(xin )) 
{
1 ≤ n ≤ l,
 = mgu( = x1 × · · · × xn)
(INV2S ) inv
′() S x1   = mgu(, x1−1)
(INV3S ) inv
′() 
S −1 (INV4S ) inv
′()×  S unit  = mgu(, )
(UNIT1S ) unit× 

S  (UNIT2S ) unit

S 1
(EXP1
S
) exp (x, ) S exp (,mult(x1, ))  = [exp (, x1)/x]
(EXP2
S
) exp (exp (, ), ) 
S exp (,mult(, ))
(ROOT1
S
) root (x, ) S root (x, )  = [exp (, x1)/x]
(ROOT2
S
) root (exp (, ), ) 
S exp (,mult(, inv()))
(CTX
S
)

S ′
C[] S C[′]
SYMBOLIC EVALUATION  ↓  iff  1S · · · nS  and  = 1 · · · n
Variables x1, . . . , xn are fresh.
notational shorthands.
A
$= a1〈exp (, nA)〉. a2(x). let z=exp (x, nA)in a3〈{d}z〉. 0,
B
$= b1(y). b2〈exp (, nB)〉. letw=exp (y, nB)in b3(t). let t ′=decw(t)in 0,
P
$= A || B.
The Difﬁe–Hellman protocol is subject to secrecy attacks from active adversaries. In
terms of our model, discovering an attack of this type to the protocol amounts to ﬁnding a
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ground trace s such that CDH = 〈
, P || g〈d〉〉 ↘ s and s  Secret(d) $= ⊥←↩ g〈d〉. And,
indeed, such an s exists and it is as follows:
a1〈exp (, nA)〉 · a2〈exp (, nI )〉 · a3〈{d}exp (,nI×nA)〉 · g〈d〉,
where nI is any environmental name.
Intuitively, the above trace corresponds to an attack in which the environment intercepts
exp (, nA), generates a name nI and handles exp (, nI ) to A, who believes the message
is from B. ThenA computes k = exp (, nI ×nA) and erroneously concludes k is a shared
key known by A and B. Finally, A sends over the network the secret datum d encrypted
under k, so d is revealed to the environment, that can compute k as exp (exp (, nA), nI ).
We show how the above attack is detected by the veriﬁcation method. First, consider the
following symbolic execution starting from CDH:
CDH −→S −→S
〈
a1〈exp (, nA)〉 · a2〈x〉,
(
let z=exp (x, nA)in a3〈{d}z〉. 0 || B || g(t). 0
)〉
S
0−→S
〈
a1〈exp (, nA)〉 · a2〈exp (, x′)〉,
(
a3〈{d}exp (,x′×nA)〉. 0 || B0 || g(t). 0
)〉
S
(∗)
−→S
〈
a1〈exp (, nA)〉 · a2〈exp (, x′)〉 · a3〈{d}exp (,x′×nA)〉,
(
B0 || g(t). 0
)〉
S
−→S 〈a1〈exp (, nA)〉 · a2〈exp (, x′)〉 · a3〈{d}exp (,x′×nA)〉 · g〈t〉, B0〉S
$= 〈, B0〉S .
In step (∗), rule (LET
S
) is applied, with exp (x, nA) ↓0 exp (, x′ × nA) and 0 =
[exp (, x′)/x], for a ﬁxed fresh x′.
Now, we show step by step how the attack is detected by the veriﬁcation method:
1. The symbolic modelModC is computed (in practice, symbolic traces would be gener-
ated ‘on-the-ﬂy’).
2. The symbolic trace  deﬁned above is considered.
3,4. Action  = g〈t〉 is found such that  uniﬁes with  = g〈d〉, via  = [d/t].
5. The set SF() = {′} is computed, where ′ = ′, and ′ = [xˆ′/x′]. As stated by
Theorem 3, ′ is a consistent trace. Note, in particular, that if we let ′ = ′′ · g〈d〉,
then ′′  d . Indeed, there exists  = dec({d}) ∈ H(′′), with  = exp (, xˆ′ × nA),
 = exp (exp (, nA), xˆ′), and SSdec({d})Sd.
6. Action ⊥ does not appear in ′, hence,
7. (No, ′) is returned.
Note that, as indicated by Theorem 5, the concrete trace s corresponding to the attack
can be recovered from ′ by mapping xˆ′ to nI .
7. An implementation: STA
Symbolic Trace Analyzer (STA) [41] is a prototype tool, written in ML, that implements
some of the veriﬁcation techniques described in the previous sections. Currently, STA
supports shared-key, public-key cryptography and hashing, while modular exponentiation
has not yet been integrated in the tool.
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We now illustrate the use of STA on the Needham–Schroeder protocol introduced in
Example 2, and check the authentication property AuthAtoB described in 3. When required
to check whether NS satisﬁes AuthAtoB, STA ﬁnds a trace of NS that violates the property.
The trace is reported below:
disclose〈kI, kA+, kB+,idA,idB,idI 〉 · a’1〈{[n′A,idA]}kI+〉,
b1〈{[n′A,idA]}kB+〉 · b2〈{[n′A, nB]}kA+〉 · a’2〈{[n′A, nB]}kA+〉,
a’3〈{[nB]}kI+〉·b3〈{[nB]}kB+〉.
This trace corresponds to the attack discovered by Lowe, that can be informally explained
as follows. A runs two parallel sessions, one seemingly with I , and the other seemingly
with B. In fact, both A and B are talking to the adversary, who intercepts all messages.
This allows the adversary to re-use the nonce n′A (issued by A in its interaction with I )
when impersonating the role ofA talking toB. Then, the adversary can induceA to decrypt
message {[n′A, nB]}kA+ , thus getting nB (actions a′2 and a′3).
This attack was found after examining 26 symbolic conﬁgurations, which took a fraction
of a second on a PC with a Pentium III processor and a 64M RAM. After repairing the
ﬂaw as suggested by Lowe, that is by inserting explicit identities inside each encrypted
message, STA ﬁnds no additional attack. The exploration reached all the 60 conﬁgurations
that constitute the complete symbolic state-space of the protocol, and this took again a
fraction of a second. We also tried a conﬁguration with two initiators (A,D) and two
responders (B,C), where each initiator can non-deterministically choose to engage in a run
with eitherB,C or I . STA found no attacks on this version either. The state-space consisting
of 24,655 symbolic conﬁgurations was completely explored in less than one minute. It is
worthwhile to notice that memory occupation is not a concern in STA, because a depth-ﬁrst
strategy is adopted when exploring the symbolic model on the ﬂy.
8. Conclusions
We have proposed a framework for the analysis of security protocols and provided some
sufﬁcient conditions under which veriﬁcation can be effectively performed via a sym-
bolic method. In contrast to ﬁnite-state model checking, our method can analyse the whole
inﬁnite state space generated by a bounded number of participants. Compared to other
symbolic techniques, we offer a simple and general methodology together with a regu-
larity condition, which can be instantiated to complete veriﬁcation methods for speciﬁc
crypto-systems. Our method is efﬁcient in practice, because the symbolic model is com-
pact, and the reﬁnement procedure at its heart is only invoked on demand and on single
symbolic traces. Note that general claims on efﬁciency should be taken with some care,
given that the protocol analysis problem is NP-hard even under very mild hypotheses (see
e.g. [38]).
Appendix A. Concrete vs. symbolic semantics
We prove Theorem 1 that establishes a correspondence between the concrete and the
symbolic transition systems. The proof is based on the lemma below.
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Lemma A.1. Let F s be a symbolic frame, C be a symbolic conﬁguration and C	 be a
conﬁguration. Then:
(1) C	−→ C′ implies that there exist C1,  and 	0 such that 	 = (	0)|dom(	), C −→S C1
and C′ = C1	0.
(2) C −→S C1 and 	 = 	0, for some 	0 such that C1	0 is a conﬁguration, imply that
C	−→ C1	0.
Proof. (1) By induction on the rules of the transition relation −→ . The cases (INP) and
(PAR) are trivial.
(OUT) 〈	, a〈	〉. A	〉−→〈	·a〈M〉, A	〉, and 	 ↓ M . By def. of symbolic frame,
 ↓ N ,	=(	0)|dom(	) andM=N	0. Then, 〈, a〈〉. A〉S −→S 〈·a〈N〉, A〉S
and also 〈·a〈N〉, A〉S	0 = 〈	·a〈M〉, A	〉. Note that above we have ex-
ploited that v(A) ⊆ dom(	) and v() ⊆ dom(	).
(LET) 〈	, let y=	inA	〉−→〈	, A	[/y]〉, with 	 ↓ . By def. of symbolic frame,
 ↓ , 	 = (	0)|dom(	) and  = 	0. Then, 〈let y =  in A〉S −→S〈,
A[/y]〉S where 〈, A[/y]〉S	0 = 〈	, A	[/y]〉.
(MATCH) 〈	, [	 = 	]A	〉−→〈	, A	〉, where 	 ↓ , 	 ↓ . By deﬁnition of
symbolic frame, 	 ↓  implies  ↓1 1, where 	 = (1	0′)|dom(	) and
 = 1	0′, for some 	′0. Also 	 = 1	0′ (v() ⊆ dom(	)) and, thus,
1 ↓2 2, where 	0′ = (2	0′′)|dom(	′0) and 2	0
′′ = , for some 	0′′. Since
 = 1	0′ = 12	0′′ = 2	′′0, then 12 and 2 are uniﬁable. Let 3 =
mgu(12, 2), i.e. 	0′′ = 3	0 for some 	0. We let  $= 123. Then, 	 = 	0
and 〈, [ = ]A〉S −→S 〈, A〉S , where 〈, A〉S	0 = 〈	, A	〉.
(2) The proof is by induction on −→S . It is similar to the previous case and then
it is omitted.
Corollary A.1 (Theorem 1). LetF s be a symbolic frame, C be an initial conﬁguration and
s be a trace of F . Then C ↘ s if and only if there exists  such that C ↘S  and s is a
solution of .
Proof. The proof easily follows by a routine induction on the number n of execution steps,
using Lemma A.1. In particular, for the ‘if’ direction, we exploit part (2) and note that
C	 = C, since C is ground. 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 relies on Lemma B.1 below. The latter essentially states that any
input message that violates the ‘sf-ness’ of a consistent symbolic trace can be decomposed
so to satisfy the premises of either of the reﬁnement rules.
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Lemma B.1 (Context lemma). LetF s be a regular frame and  be amarked symbolic trace
in sf. If 	 satisﬁes  · a〈M〉 and  M , then either:
(a) ∃C[·], N s.t. N /∈ b() ∪ V ∪ Vˆ ,M = C[N ], and N	 ∈ b()	 or
(b) ∃ x ∈ v(M) s.t. 	 	(x).
Proof. Since 	 satisﬁes  · a〈M〉, then 	 M	 and ∀ xˆ ∈ v(M), 	 	(xˆ). Since F is
regular, M	 ∈ H(b(	)). The proof is by induction on the least index i such that M	 ∈
Hi (b(	)).
(i = 0) M	 ∈ b(	). Depending on the form of M, there are three cases:
• M = xˆ orM = a. These cases cannot arise, as they would imply  M .
• M = x. Then, (b) holds.
• M /∈ V ∪ Vˆ .M /∈ b() as, otherwise, it would follow  M . SinceF is regular, b(	) ⊆
b()	, thus, there exists N ′ ∈ b() such that M	 = N ′	. Then, we deﬁne C $= [·],
N
$= M . N	 ∈ b()	, as N ′ ∈ b() and N	 = N ′	; thus, (a) holds.
(i > 0) M = f (M˜ ′), where M˜ ′	 ⊆ Hi−1(	). Note that, for someMi ′ ∈ M˜ ′,  Mi ′, as
otherwise  M , by deﬁnition of H(·). By induction hypothesis, either (aa) there
existC′ andN ′ s.t.N ′ /∈ b()∪V∪Vˆ ,Mi ′ = C′[N ′], andN ′	 ∈ b()	 or (bb) there
exists x ∈ v(Mi ′) such that	 	(x). Obviously (bb) implies (b). If (aa) holds, then
we choose N $= N ′ and C[·] $= f (M˜ ′1, C′[·], M˜ ′2), where M˜ ′ = (M˜ ′1,Mi ′, M˜ ′2),
thus (a) holds true. 
Lemma B.2 (Lemma 1). Let F s be a regular frame and  be a marked symbolic trace in
F s . Suppose that 	 satisﬁes . Then either  is in sf, or there are ′ and 	′ such that  " ′,
	 = ′	′, and 	′ satisﬁes ′.
Proof. Suppose that  is not in sf and let 1 be the longest preﬁx of  which is in sf. This
means that  = 1 · a〈M〉 · 2, for some M s.t. 1 M . Since 	 satisﬁes , we must have
1	 M	. By Lemma B.1, either (a) there exist C[·], N,N ′ such that N /∈ b(1)∪ V ∪ Vˆ ,
M = C[N ],N ′ ∈ b(1) andN ′	 = N	, or (b) there exists x ∈ v(M) such that 1	 	(x).
If (a) is the case, there exists  = mgu(N,N ′) and 	 is an instance of  as a substitution.
By rule (REF1),  " ′ = [y˜/˜yˆ], for an appropriate renaming [y˜/˜yˆ]. Furthermore, 	 =
[y˜/˜yˆ]	′, for some ground substitution 	′. Also note that, thanks to the renaming [y˜/˜yˆ], for
each xˆ ∈ v(′), ′\xˆ is not longer than \xˆ, and this guarantees that 	′ satisﬁes ′. Thus
we have found ′ and 	′ as required by the statement of the lemma.
If (b) holds, then we can apply (REF2), deﬁne ′ = [xˆ/x] and 	′ = [x/xˆ]	, and the thesis
will follow. 
Appendix C. Proofs on F spk
C.1. F spk is a Symbolic Frame
Notation: By  V we mean that  S , with (v()\v()) ⊆ V , and by   ∗V  that

1V1 · · · nVn , with V =
n⋃
1
Vi , for some n ≥ 0 and  = 1 · · · n. Moreover, by  \ V
we mean  \ (V × E).
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Lemma C.1. Suppose andS are deﬁned, respectively, as in Tables 1 and 4. Then:
(1) If 	 then ∀X ⊇ dom(	), ∃ ′,	0 and V : X ∩ V = ∅, such that   ∗V ′,
	 = (	0) \ V and ′	0 = . Furthermore,  ∈M implies ′ ∈M.
(2) If  S  and 	 = 	0, for some 	0, then 	∗	0.
Proof. (1)By induction on 	.We only consider themost interesting case of decryption.
(DEC) Let 	 = decpk
−({[]}+). Then,  = dec
pk
′′ (
′), with ′	 = {[]}+ and ′′	 = −.
Let V = {x1, x2} be such that V ∩ X = ∅. Then, there exists ′ = mgu(′ =
{[x1]}x+2 , 
′′ = x−2 ) and 	 = (′	′0) \ V , for some 	′0. By deﬁnition ofS, 
′V
x1
′ $= ′′, with ′′	′0 = x1′	′0 = ′	′0 = . Now let  = M ∈ M. Then
′′	′0 = M implies 	′0 = [x˜+/˜x]	0 (where x˜ are the variables which occur in key
position in ′′) for some 	0, and ′′
 ∗∅ ′′′′ $= M ′ ∈ M, with ′′ $= [x˜+/˜x].
Finally,   ∗V ′, with  $= ′′′ and ′	0 = ′′′′	0 = ′′	′0 =  ∈M.
(2) By structural induction on the rulesS.
(ENC
S
) {[]}x S {[]}x+ ,with  = [x+/x]. We prove that {[	]}x	∗ {[]}x+	0 in 0 steps.
Indeed, {[]}x+	0 = {[]}(x)	0 = {[	]}	(x).
(PRJ
S
) i () S xi,]with = mgu(, 〈x1, x2〉). Bydeﬁnitionof,i (	) = i (	0) =
i (〈x1	0, x2	0〉) and i (〈x1	0, x2	0〉)xi	0, by applying rules of.
(DEC
S
) decpk ()
S x1, with  = mgu( = {[x1]}x+2 , = x
−
2 ). By deﬁnition of ,
decpk	(	) = decpk	0(	0) = dec
pk
x−2 	0
({[x1	0]}x+2 	0). Finally, by applying
rules of, decpk
x−2 	0
({[x1	0]}x+2 	0)x1	0.
(CTX
S
) By induction hypothesis, 	∗′	0 and, by rules of, C	[	]∗C	[′	0], i.e.
(C[])	∗(C[′])	0. 
Proposition C.1. (a) If 	∗ then ∀X ⊇ dom(	), ∃V : X ∩ V = ∅ such that   ∗V ′,
with 	 = (	0) \ V and ′	0 = . Furthermore,  ∈M implies ′ ∈M.
(b) If   ∗S  and 	 = 	0, for some 	0, then 	∗	0.
Proof. (a) By induction on the number n of steps of relation , such that 	n. The
case n = 0 is trivial. Suppose n > 0 and 	n−1. By induction hypothesis,  
′ ∗V ′ ′,
with V ′ ∩ X = ∅, 	 = (′	′0) \ V ′ and ′	′0 = . By  = ′	′0 and by Lemma C.1
(applied to X ∪ V ′) it follows that ′ 
′′ ∗V ′′ ′, with V ′′ ∩ (X ∪ V ′) = ∅, 	′0 = (′′	0) \ V ′′
and ′	0 = . Now, let  = ′′′ and V = V ′ ∪ V ′′. Then,   ∗V , with V ∩ X = ∅
and 	 = (′	′0) \ V ′ = (′((′′	0) \ V ′′)) \ V ′ = ((′′′	0) \ V ′′) \ V ′ = (	0) \ V ,
exploiting the fact that v(′) ⊆ (X ∪ V ′). Furthermore, if  ∈ M, then ′ ∈ M, by
Lemma C.1.
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(b) By induction on the number n of steps of relation S, i.e. such that  1S 1 2S
· · · nS , with 	 = 12 · · · n	0, for some 	0. The case n = 0 is trivial. Suppose

1S 1
2S · · · nS n n+1S . By induction hypothesis, 	 ↓ n	0, for some 	0 such
that 	 = 1 · · · n	0. By applying Lemma C.1 to n	0, it follows that 	∗n	0	′0,
for some 	′0. 
Corollary C.1 (Proposition 1). F spk is a symbolic frame.
Proof. It trivially follows by Proposition C.1 with X $= dom(	). 
C.2. F spk is a regular frame
We now prove that F spk is a regular frame. Propositions C.2 and C.3 below state that bpk
satisﬁes, respectively, Conditions 1 and 2 in the deﬁnition of regular frame (Deﬁnition 10).
In particular, note that Proposition C.2 generalises Condition 1 in Deﬁnition 10, since 
below can be either a trace or a solved form.
Proposition C.2. Let  be a sf or a trace in F spk . Suppose v(M) ⊆ V̂ . Then,  M iff
M ∈ H(bpk()).
Proof. Suppose  M . By induction on the structure ofM .
• M ∈ EN . Then,M ∈ H0(bpk()).
• M = (xˆ)±. Then,M ∈ H1(bpk()).
• M = (m)±. Then, (m)± ∈ H1(bpk()), by deﬁnition.
• M = 〈M1,M2〉. By induction hypothesis M1, M2 ∈ H(bpk()) and, consequently,
M ∈ H(bpk()).
• M = {[M ′]}u+ . If 〈M ′, u+〉, M ∈ bpk(), by deﬁnition. Otherwise, by induction
hypothesis, u+, M ′ ∈ H(bpk()) and, thus, {[M ′]}u+ = M ∈ H(bpk()).
On the other hand, suppose M ∈ H(bpk()). By induction on the least j such that M ∈
Hj (bpk()).
(j = 0) There are two cases. If M ∈ V̂ ∪ EN , trivially  M . Else M ∈ bpk() and it
follows by deﬁnition that  M .
(j > 0) Suppose M = {[M ′]}u+ (the case M = 〈M1,M2〉 is analogous), with M ′, u+ ∈
Hj−1(bpk()). Then, the thesis follows by induction hypothesis onM ′ and u+.

The proof of Proposition C.3 relies on the lemmata below. Lemma C.2 says that the
deducibility relation on messages,  M , is preserved by ground substitutions 	, under
suitable conditions. LemmaC.3 generalises PropositionC.2 to arbitrary terms . LemmaC.4
is a sort of ‘converse’ of Lemma C.2 (i.e., from 	  	 it is deduced that   , under
appropriate conditions).
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Lemma C.2. Let  be in sf and 	 be a substitution that satisﬁes . If  M , then:
(1) v(M) ⊆ V̂ .
(2) 	 M	.
Proof. Let 0 be the shortest preﬁx of  such that 0 M . The proof is by induction on
|0|. The case |0| = 0 is obvious. If |0| > 0, we proceed by induction on the least index
j such that there exists  ∈ Hj (0), with  ↓ M .
(j = 0) Necessarily  = M . The caseM ∈ V̂∪EN is obvious. IfM ∈ 0 thenM	 ∈ 0	
and thus 0	 M	, i.e. (2). We now prove (1). It is not the case thatM is an input
message, i.e. 0 = 1 · a〈M〉 · 2, as it would imply 1 M (by deﬁnition of
sf), in contradiction to the hypothesis on 0. Then necessarily M is an output
message, i.e. 0 = 1 · a〈M〉 · 2. By deﬁnition of symbolic trace, it follows
that v(M) ∩ V ⊆ v(1) ∩ V . By induction hypothesis on 1, v(1) ∩ V = ∅
(otherwise, (1) would be violated for 1) and, thus, v(M) ⊆ V̂ .
(j > 0) Suppose  = decpk2 (1)with 1 ↓ {[M]}u+ and 2 ↓ u−. By induction hypothesis,
v({[M]}u+ , u−) ⊆ V̂ , which implies (1) for M . Also, by induction hypothesis,
0	  {[M	]}(u+	) and 0	  (u−)	. It follows that 0	 M	. The other cases
( = +,  = −,  = 〈1, 2〉,  = i () are similar). 
Remark C.1. (1) It is straightforward to prove the analogue of Lemma C.2(1) for traces,
i.e.: Let s be a trace andM a message such that s M , then v(M) ⊆ V̂ .
(2) Let  be a sf. Then v() ⊆ V̂ . This fact trivially follows by Lemma C.2(1).
Let us now generalise the deﬁnition of deduction relation  to arbitrary terms, by letting
   if and only if ∃ ∈ H() :  ↓ .
Lemma C.3. Let  be in sf in F spk . Then,    if and only if  ∈ H(bpk()).
Proof. The ‘if’ part of the lemma is proved by an easy induction on the least j such that
 ∈ Hi (bpk()). Conversely, suppose  ↓ , for some  ∈ H(). The proof is by induction
on the least j such that  ∈ Hj ().
(j = 0) Then, either  =  = M ∈  for someM, and the result follows from Lemma C.1,
or ,  ∈ EN ∪ V̂ , and the result is trivial.
(j > 0) We distinguish the outermost operator of . The only non-trivial case is  =
decpk1 (2), where 2 ↓ {[]}′+ and 1 ↓ ′−. By induction on j, {[]}′+ ∈ H(bpk()).
The are two cases:
1. {[]}′+ ∈ H0(bpk()). Then, it must be {[]}′+ = {[M]}u+ ∈ bpk(), hence  = M ,
for some M. Again, the thesis follows from Lemma C.1.
2. {[]}′+ ∈ Hi (bpk()) with i > 0, hence  ∈ H(bpk()), which is the thesis for this
case. 
Lemma C.4. Let  be in sf, 	 satisfy  and A = {m,m+,m− |m ∈ N }. If 	  , with 
ground, then there exists , with v() ⊆ v() such that    and 	 = . Moreover, if
 ∈ A then  = .
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Proof. Let 0 be the shortest preﬁx of  such that 0	  . The proof is by induction on
|0|. If |0| = 0, we take  $= . And, indeed, 0   since n() ⊆ EN . If |0| > 0, we
proceed by induction on the least index j such that there exists  ∈ Hj (0	), with  ↓ .
(j = 0) Itmust be  =  = M ∈ 0∪EN . The caseM ∈ EN is obvious. IfM ∈ 0	, there
exists  = N ∈ 0 such thatN	 = M and obviously v(N) ⊆ v(). Furthermore,
it is not the case that N = (xˆ)±, as this would imply (0 \ xˆ)	 	(xˆ)± = M ,
with 0 \ xˆ shorter than 0, contradicting the minimality of 0. Also, it is not
the case that N = (x)±, as v(0) ⊆ V̂ , by Remark C.1(2). It follows that if
M = (m)± ∈ A then N = M , since N	 = M .
(j > 0) There are different cases, depending on the outermost operator of . Here we
consider the only non-trivial case, i.e.  = decpk1 (2), where 2 ↓ {[]}+ and
1 ↓ −. By induction hypothesis (internal or external) it follows that there are
1 and 2 such that:
(i) 0  1 = {[]}′ , with v({[]}′) ⊆ v(0) and {[]}′	 = {[]}+ , for some ,′
(note that we can assume w.l.o.g. that 1 /∈ V̂ , by considering the shortest preﬁx ′0
of 0 s.t. ′0	  {[]}+ ).
(ii) 0  2, with v(2) ⊆ v(0) and 2	 = −. Moreover, if − ∈ A then 2 = −.
By Lemma C.3 it follows that {[]}′ ∈ H(bpk(0)), hence there are two cases:
(1) {[]}′ ∈ bpk(0). In this case, {[]}′ = {[N ]}k+ , for some N, k. (Note that it cannot
arise that ′ = xˆ+, a+, by deﬁnition of bpk(·), or ′ = x+ since v(′) ⊆ v(0) ⊆
V̂ by Remark C.1 (2).) Hence,  = k, from (i).
By (ii) it follows that 2 = k−. By 0  {[]}k+ and 0  k− it follows that 0  ,
where by (i) 	 = , and v() ⊆ v(0). Moreover, if  ∈ A then obviously  = 
(in particular, it is not the case that  = xˆ, by the minimality of 0).
(2) {[]}′+ ∈ Ht (bpk(0)), t > 0. Thus, ,′+ ∈ H(bpk(0)). By Lemma C.3, 0  
and by (i) 	 =  and v() ⊆ v(0). Finally,  ∈ A implies  = , by the same
reasoning as in (1) (from (i)).
Proposition C.3. Let  be in sf in F spk . Then, bpk(	) ⊆ bpk()	, for any 	 that
satisﬁes .
Proof. SupposeM ∈ bpk(	). Note that, by Remark C.1(1) and by deﬁnition of bpk(·),M
is necessarily ground.We have to prove that there existsN ∈ bpk() such thatN	 = M . Let
0 be the shortest preﬁx of  such that 0	 M . Clearly,M ∈ bpk(0	) too. We distinguish
the two possible cases, depending on the structure ofM .
• M = (k)±. Then 0  (k)± by Lemma C.4 and obviously   (k)±. In this case, we take
N
$= (k)± ∈ bpk().
• M = {[M ′]}k+ , with 	〈M ′,m+〉. By Lemma C.4 there exists  such that 0  ,
v() ⊆ v(0) and 	 = M . By the hypotheses on 0,  = xˆ and so it must be
 = {[′]}, for some ′,. Now, by Lemma C.3, it follows that  ∈ Hj (bpk(0)), for
some j ≥ 0. But it holds that 〈′,〉, otherwise by Lemma C.2 it would follow that
	  〈′	,	〉 = 〈M ′, k+〉, contradicting the hypothesis that M ∈ bpk(	). Therefore
it must be j = 0, hence  = N ∈ bpk() and N	 = M . 
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Theorem C.1 (Theorem 2). F spk is a regular frame.
Proof. The two conditions of regularity follow, respectively, from Proposition C.2
(note that, by Remark C.1(1), if 	 is a trace and 	 M then v(M) ⊆ V̂) and
Proposition C.3. 
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